University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Business - Economics Working Papers

Faculty of Business

1993

Scientific management and market stabilisation,
1914 - 1930
Kyle Bruce
University of Wollongong

Chris Nyland
University of Wollongong

Recommended Citation
Bruce, Kyle and Nyland, Chris, Scientific management and market stabilisation, 1914 - 1930, Department of Economics, University of
Wollongong, Working Paper 93-6, 1993, 49.
http://ro.uow.edu.au/commwkpapers/288

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au

THE U N I V E R S I T Y
OF W O L L O N G O N G

rx D i D E P A R T M E N T
OF E C O N O M I C S

S c ie n tific M an ag em en t and M a rk e t
S t a b i l i s a t i o n , 1914-1930

Kyle Bruce and Chris Nyland

ISSN 1035 4581

WP 93-6

ISBN 0 8 6 4 1 8 2 7 7 5

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND MARKET
STABILISATION, 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 3 0

Kyle Bruce
and
Chris Nyland

Department o f Economics
The University of Wollongong
Northfields Avenue
Wollongong NSW Australia

Coordinated by Dr. C. Harvle & Associate Professor M.M. Metwally
Working Paper Production & Administration: Robert Hood
Department of Economics, University of Wollongong
Northfields Avenue, Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia

Department of Economics
University of Wollongong
Working Paper Series WP 93-6
ISSN 1035 4581
ISBN 0 86418 277 5

ABSTRACT
T h is
paper
exam ines
the
contribution made by the scientific
management movement to the
stabilisation of production and
employment in the United States in
the years 1914-1930. By focusing
on the debates in the official journal
of the Taylor Society, the paper is
able to sketch the manner by which
the ideas of the Taylorists evolved
throughout this period. Beginning
by
c o n c e n tr a tin g
on
the
d e v e lo p m e n t
of
stabilisation
practices at the workshop level, it
is shown that the scientific
managers came to focus, in time, on
the whole firm and eventually
became convinced that an effective
stabilisation strategy must embrace
all
levels
o f the
econom ic
environment.

Perhaps no better way exists .... of understanding the progress
and diffusion of the [scientific management] movement than in
tracing it through the files of the Bulletin of the Taylor Society,
which has been hospitable to suggestions, from every source, for
increased efficiency and which has recorded the chief successes
and failures of the great variety of experiments in recent years
(Rexford Tugwell 1927,122).

In the labour economics literature, the notion of scientific
m anagem ent is associated with the American theorist
Frederick Winslow Taylor and is primarily perceived as being
an anti-worker, labour control strategy. The prevalence of this
perspective, makes it difficult for analysts to comprehend why
it was that the trade unions in the United States collaborated
with the leaders of the scientific management movement
through the inter-w ar years. It is our contention this
development can be understood only if one is aware of the
extent to which the Taylorists concerned themselves with
issues such as the reduction of working hours and the
democratisation of public institutions. Recent studies of the
scientific managers' involvement in the above areas have
been undertaken respectively by Nyland (1989) and Schachter
(1989). These revisionist historians have sought to highlight
the fact that labour control was far from being the scientific
managers' only area of interest. In this article we seek to add to
this literature by outlining the theoretical and practical
contribution made by the Taylorists to the stabilisation of the
business cycle and hence to the creation of employment
security.
Taking up Tugw ell's suggestion, the major vehicle we
utilise to examine the scientific managers' contribution to

market stabilisation is The Bulletin o f the Taylor Society
(BTS). This journal, begun in 1914, was the official publication
of The Taylor Society. The latter body was an organisation
whose primary purpose was the promotion and development
of the ideas of those individuals who worked with or who
were inspired by Taylor. We have chosen to use the Society's
journal as our instrument of investigation in order to reduce
the danger that we will misrepresent the character of scientific
management or be guilty of the myopia which distinguishes
those analysts whom H.S. Person (1929, 5), the M anaging
Director of the Society through the 1920s, described as the
"superficially informed". By this he meant those who believe
that the "system atic planning and directing of w ork"
constituted the whole of the Taylor system.
SHOP AND WAR PLANNING
C entral to the scientific m anagers' approach to the
stabilisation of the business cycle was their belief in the value
of the scientific method of investigation. The Taylorists were
convinced that rule of thumb and tradition were not
acceptable bases for guiding the production and distribution of
wealth. Indeed, Taylor insisted that the rigorous application of
the scientific method to the problem of management was
fundamental to the scientific managers methodology.
Scientific management cannot be said to exist .... in any
establishment until after [a] .... change has taken place in the
mental attitude of both the management and the men, both as to
their duty to cooperate in producing the largest possible surplus
and as to the necessity for substituting exact scientific knowledge
for opinions or the old rule of thumb or individual knowledge.
These are the two absolutely essential elements of scientific

management. (Taylor 1911, 1389)
In relation to the second element Person observed a decade
later that scientific management contained two fundamental
ideas.
The first is that management should analyze every phase or
element of the business so far as possible in accordance with the
scientific method—the method which by research,
investigation, experiment or otherwise secures all available
data concerning each phase or element of the business—physical,
physiological or psychological—and derives therefrom
relatively stable and dependable facts on which to base plans
and procedures .... The second fundamental idea is that, those
dependable facts once ascertained, plans for operation and
operating controls shall be developed which are relatively
precise in their intentions and expectations of results, because
based upon a knowledge of conditions resulting from the
preceding scientific analyses (Person 1921, 50).
W riting in 1929, Person observed that the issues the
scientific managers focused upon tended to change over time.
This tendency could be perceived in the work of Taylor and it
was a process that continued after the latter's death. At the
same time Person insisted that this constant modification of
the ideas, areas of concern and techniques of scientific
m anagem ent in no way constituted an abandonment of
Taylor's principles (1929,10).
In both Taylor's own writings and in the work of Taylorists
published prior to the United States' entry into the First
World War, the advocates of scientific management primarily
confined them selves to workshop problems wherein they
applied their techniques to the determination of how and
when production was to be undertaken. However, it should

be noted that at no stage was scientific m anagem ent
considered to be merely a labour control device or simply a
philosophy designed to legitimate bureaucratic management
systems.
As Taylor himself insisted, scientific management was more than
just a program for time study or an incentive wage system; rather,
it was a comprehensive plan, composed of a number of
interrelated innovations that promised to improve the overall
productive efficiency of the enterprise. The first step in the ideal
scientific management program was always the improvement
and standardization of tools and equipment and the improvement
of various aspects of shop organization. The latter process could
include the development of a better storage system, the
installation of more comprehensive cost accounting procedures,
and the establishment of a system for routine maintenance and
repair (Meiksins 1984, 180).
It should also be noted that while Taylor confined the
application of his ideas primarily to the workshop he never
believed they were only applicable in this arena. He
concentrated on the shop because he was convinced this was
where he could make his greatest contribution but he urged
others to seek to apply the scientific m ethod to the
management of all areas of productive activity.
That the pre-war Taylorists had concerns that were broader
than the workshop is manifest in the fact that as early as 1908
there are indications of concern in the work of some of these
individuals of the fact that productive efficiency tends to be
undermined by the volatility of the capitalist business cycle.
Prior to the founding of the BTS ind ivid ual em ployer
m em bers of the scie n tific m an agem ent m ov em en t
experimented with a range of measures designed to stabilise
the demand for their products and the employment security

of their em ployees. Of the latter individuals the most
influential and innovative was Henry Dennison an employer
who later served a term as President of the Taylor Society and
who was subsequently described by J.K. Galbraith (1981, 61) as
"arguably, the most interesting businessman in the United
States".
M etcalf has observed that after the depression of 1908
D ennison "introd uced practically the whole gamut of
m easures prom oted to 'regularize' business operations"
(Metcalf 1975, 63).
First, the company modified the time pattern of its demand by
reorganizing its sales department to make it more responsive to
efforts to reduce the costs of instability, by applying sales effort
to secure orders further in advance and increase business during
slack periods, and by diversifying into new markets to spread
demand. Second, it made production rates more stable than orders
and shipments by systematically producing to inventory during
slack periods. Employment was made more stable than
production by a policy of training workers for transfer between
departments. A third measure, begun after the 1914 depression,
involved counter-cyclical planning of plant construction. Finally,
the company secured its outstanding reputation in the field of
employment stabilization by establishing, in 1916, the first
company unemployment compensation fund in the country
(Metcalf 1975, 63).
G albraith reports that D ennison's adoption of these
stabilisation techniques was resented by other employers who
organised a boycott of his firm on the grounds that he was
"spoiling the working classes" (Galbraith 1981, 62). This
contrasts with the warm reception of his ideas within the
Taylor Society whose members perceived the downturns in
economic activity that periodically characterised the business

cycle as both a disaster for employers and employees and as
enormously wasteful of resources. The Taylorists' perspective
regarding the waste induced by the business cycle is
encapsulated in a 1923 observation by N.I. Stone in the BTS.
The recurrence of business cycles is one of the worst, if not the
worst, disturbers of managerial plans for the orderly and
economic operation of industrial plants. Efficient plant operation
above all requires regularity in the repetitive processes of
industry. This regularity is widely upset by the intrusion of
outside economic forces having nothing to do with internal plant
management and over which the plant engineer has no control.
Plant organizations, including specialists of high degree, skilled
mechanics trained and disciplined through years of hard work in
the special processes developed in the particular plant, plant
morale built up through the laborious effort of the employment
manager, an esprit de corps, developed among the staff of
executives and foremen, are all swept away almost over night
through the necessity of shutting down the plant dictated by the
sudden cessation of orders and the drying up of bank credit ....
When plant operations are resumed after the storm is over, most
of the work of the plant managers must be done over again with a
newly rebuilt organization. Even the work of unskilled labor
suffers under the circumstances, for there is hardly any labor, no
matter how low the degree of skill, that does not gain in
efficiency through acquaintance with and adaptation to the
conditions of each plant, and it therefore takes time to "tune up"
a plant to a performance somewhere near 100 per cent of its
capacity (Stone 1923, 93).
Dennison's stabilisation techniques were applauded in the
BTS in 1915 in a paper by R.G. Valentine titled 'Scientific
Management and Organised Labor'. In this article Valentine
called upon the members of the scientific m anagem ent

movement to emulate Dennison's policies and to strive to
plan production in a m anner that would dam pen the
fluctuations caused by both seasonality and by the business
cycle.
[Y]ou should plan as far as you possibly could for regularity of
employment; first by regulating your own business to the greatest
extent possible, and secondly, .... you should establish and have
some idea of co-operative relationship with other concerns in
other lines of industry, so that when your slack period came,
when yours came against his full period, your could make some
shift to the advantage of each, and thirdly, as business men
looking after your own interests .... you [should] take some kind of
interest in state public work, so the state would not be going into
the market when wages were high and business good, but instead
when condition of unemployment bad (Valentine 1915,5-6).
The volume of the BTS published in 1916 was even m ore
propitious both as regards the notion of market stabilisation.
In an article titled 'The Progressive Relation Betw een
Efficiency And Consent', Valentine (1916: 11-13) argued that
the Society needed to widen its focus from particular plants to
the entire field of industry. He called for the establishment of
a planning departm ent within the Society which would
investigate not only the best way to organise production and
distribution but which would also study the social, industrial
and moral effects of various forms of production. However,
for our purposes the most significant paper of this volume
was presented by H.S. Person. The latter, aw are the
fluctuations that characterised the business cycle were a major
cause of waste and inefficiency and that the slumps associated
with these cycles had a disastrous effect on the lives of
workers and the profits of firms, observed that the systematic
planning of production had much to offer those who would

provide workers with greater job security.
I think I see in it [the notion of planning] the opportunity for
regularizing employment .... I do not see any possibility of
regularization without precise knowledge of facts, ability to
predict, and precise control; and one plant—a Scientific
Management plant—has had the nerve to tackle the problem of
regularizing employment by deliberately not making all it can in
full season and holding production over to the dull season (Person
1916, 21).
When the United States entered the First World War, most
of the leading Taylorists took employment with governm ent
agencies such as the War Industries Board (Haber 1964, 118120). This latter body has been described by Schlesinger (1957:
40) as "the central experiment in economic planning" of the
war period. Through the Board, the Federal Governm ent
directed industrial production, selecting industries and
products which were considered essential and giving them
preference in the use of m aterials, labour, capital, and
transportation. Unlike the planning adopted subsequently in
the Soviet Union the American planners did not seek to
substitute state ownership of the means of production for
private enterprise. This point has been stressed by Soule (1967)
in his history of American economic planning in order to
make the point that planning even when undertaken at a
national level does not necessarily mean the abolition of
market forces, or the outlawing of private property or the
profit motive.
Rather, it means influencing existing economic habits and outlook
by a program which serves needs not contemplated by, and not
normally fulfilled by, the existing order. National planning
looks at wider horizons or longer futures than do the daily

decisions of the managers of individual firms or industries. And
its goals, if sanctioned by the citizens, make use of foresights and
capabilities developed by the "organizing man", in the domain
of a whole society (Soule 1967,16).

HERBERT HOOVER AND W ASTE
The Taylorists' experience with war planning had a dramatic
effect on the thinking of the leaders of the scientific
management movement. They were tremendously impressed
at the extent to which the government's program of managed
mobilisation expanded industrial output. Through the war, as
John Maurice Clark (1931, 170) a frequent visitor to Taylor
Society m eetings has noted, American industry proved
capable of producing at a capacity that had previously been
held to be unattainable. With the end of the conflict most
observers argued the war experience offered no insights for
the conduct of business in peacetime. The members of the
Taylor Society, on the other hand, tended to believe that the
war had vindicated their belief that conscious, systematic
intervention in the production process had the potential to
expand dramatically the wealth of society (Person 1919,10-14).
H.S. Person observed in 1927 that the war experience
changed the scientific management movement from a force
concerned with the "stabilization of shop processes" to one
whose focus was the "stabilization of all the processes of the
enterp rise" (Person 1927, 391). This transform ation is
exemplified in the post-war ideas and practices of Herbert
H oover, the m ost prom inent advocate of scientific
management through the 1920s. In his respective positions as
President of the Federated American Engineering Societies,
Secretary of Commerce and President of the United States,
Hoover played a critical role in furthering the transformation

of scientific management from an enterprise concern to an
industry and eventually a national affair. Though an
enthusiastic supporter of capitalism, Hoover accepted that the
market did not always allocate resources in the most efficient
manner. He therefore supported the use of the visible hand of
planning at both the micro and macro level and thought
himself to be a "scientific manager of the economy" (Barber
1985,99).
W here cla ssic a l econ om ists m ooted unrestrained
competition between independent economic units as the best
means of ensuring prosperity, Hoover envisaged active
cooperation between business and government (Wilson 1975,
68). However, he was not a "statist" He had a deep ideological
commitment to the notion that private and local public
institutions, had to accept responsibility for solving social
problems. Consequently, he rejected both federal government
direction of econom ic activity and the enforcem ent on
individual firms of the policies of those trade organisations
that claimed to represent the collective interests of business.
While he believed in the need for "national planning of
industry and com m erce" he meant by this only that
decentralised corporate planning should take place within the
context of a larger perspective than the individual business
and this especially so as regards such issues as the
standardisation of parts and equipment. The state itself was
not to directly plan and direct industry. Rather its role was to
assist firm s to plan effectively by accum ulating and
dissem inating knowledge of existing trends w ithin the
econom y. H oover believed the "associative state" he
envisaged would provide a "middle way .... between laissezfaire, antistatist economic formula that would ruthlessly
'liquidate' wages and jobs and statist proposals that would
expand bureaucratic controls destructive to A m erican

enterprise" (Murphy 1988, 10 - 11). In the early 1920s he
maintained that: "If we could secure this cooperation .... we
should have provided a new economic system, based neither
on the capitalism of Adam Smith nor upon the socialism of
Karl Marx" (cited in Layton 1971: 192).
In November 1920 Hoover was elected President of the
Federated American Engineering Societies. His election was
largely a consequence of the fact that 'progressives' within the
professional engineering associations were demanding that
their societies play a larger role in the social life of the nation.
Metcalf (1975,64) reports these progressives came largely from
that sector of the engineering profession who considered
themselves the "heirs of Frederick Taylor". The influence of
this faction was reflected in the fact that im mediately
following Hoover's election the executive of the Federation
approved a proposal for "an investigation of Industrial
W astes" and appointed Taylor Society members to the
majority of the positions on the Committee charged with
conducting the study (Layton 1971,194).
The Committee on the Elimination of Waste in Industry
began its work early in 1921, some fifty engineers gathered
information on two hundred and twenty-eight plants in six
m ajor industries. The Committee used a common- sense
approach to define industrial efficiency expressing waste as the
difference between the average efficiency of the enterprises
sampled in each industry and the most efficient plant in the
same class (Mitchell 1922; Knoeppel 1922). What Hoover
hoped to achieve in the waste survey he made clear in a paper
he published in the BTS (Hoover 1921). He stated that the
study would attempt to visualise the nation as a single
ind ustrial organism and identify the prim ary factors
obstructing the maximisation of production. He believed the
major causes of industrial waste were the inefficient use of

labour, poor coordination between industries and lack of
standardisation. The greatest single factor obstructing output
maximisation he maintained were the "large periods of slack
production and unemployment" that occurred as a result of
the "ebb and flow of economic tides between booms and
slumps" (Hoover 1921, 78).
Hoover's solution for the instability caused by the business
cycle was the "coordination of great industries" by the
provision of appropriate knowledge. He accepted the validity
of Say's Law that supply creates its own demand but accepted
that overproduction could occur as a result of industries
producing the wrong goods because they lacked adequate
inform ation.
There is no such thing as the nation over-production, if it
produces the right commodities. The commodities or services
produced by the whole nation are capable of absorption by the
whole nation if they are of the right character. In other words, if
we could attune the whole industrial machine to the highest
pitch .... an increasing production would mean a directly
increasing standard of living (Hoover 1921, 77-78).
Hoover accepted it was not possible to attain the "ideal" of a
constant steady increase in production because of society's
"inability to ever gauge the advance on growth consumption
or the approach of saturation". However, he believed that if
private and public enterprises were provided with more
"timely, more regular, and more complete information of the
current production and consumption and stocks of the great
commodities in the United States" it would be possible to
"clip the top of booms and the depression from slum ps"
(Hoover 1923, vi-vii).
The Waste Committee concluded that the primary source
of inefficiency within the USA was the poor quality of its

m anagem ent. It also endorsed H oover's b elief that
management's inability to stabilise the business cycle was the
single greatest source of inefficiency. Consequently, the
Committee argued that it was critical that there be developed
means for reducing the volatility of market fluctuations. At
the level of the enterprise it advocated the closer correlation
of production schedules with sales policies and the balancing
of productive capacity (Committee on Waste in Industry 1921,
25). It also recommended the development of programs that
would lessen the seasonal character of production in such
industries as construction and coal mining, the establishment
of trade associations which would collect information on
output and stock levels and the planning of investment so
that this form of spending would act as a stimulant in times of
recession. Of the last issue the Committee observed:
Studies of industries as a whole show that we usually expand our
equipment as the periods of maximum demand for products
instead of doing our plant expansion during periods of slack
consumption. While it cannot be expected that all industry could
be so stabilized as to do its capital construction in slack periods,
there are some industries which could be led in this direction by
co-operation with the government and co-operation among
themselves. This applies particularly to railways, telephones,
telegraphs, power concerns and other public utilities, and to
expenditure upon our municipal, state and national public works
(Committee on Waste in Industry 1921,32-33).
The breadth of the Waste Committee's report justifies
M etcalf's claim that the study was a landm ark in the
transition of scientific management from what Hoover
characterised as its pre-war devotion "to the minutiae of shop
and office routine [to] broad questions of policy-making" (cited
by Metcalf 1975, 64). Within the Taylor society the report was

warmly though critically received. This response reflected not
only the composition of the Waste Committee but also the
fact that as Drury observed in 1922:
[T]he leaders in scientific management have lately come to feel
that the highest efficiency in industry and, indeed, all
industries are studied and improved as one whole. The movement
in this direction has been led by Herbert Hoover, first as
president of the Federated American Engineering Societies, and
more recently as Secretary of Commerce (Drury 1922,9).
That the Taylorists considered the report to be the product of
their efforts was made clear by Person in a 1923 BTS paper
titled 'On The Contribution Of Scientific M anagem ent To
Industrial Problems'. In this article Person observed that the
work of the Committee on the Elimination of Waste was
Taylorism in its purest form. The Committee "was composed
largely of Taylor engineers, its point of view was entirely
Taylor, and the standards by which it judged waste were the
standards .... of scientific management" (Person 1923, 118).
H oov er's prom otion of the scientific m anagem ent
movement continued after he was appointed Secretary of
Commerce. He employed E.E. Hunt of the Taylor Society as
his personnel assistant and together they reorganised the
Department. In this reorganisation the Division of Building
and Housing was developed in order to eliminate wastes in
the building industry by developing uniform m unicipal
building codes, by reorganising the financing of the industry
and by studying city and town zoning (Hunt 1924, xiii). A
central place was also accorded a newly created Division of
Simplified Practice which Barber reports was staffed by "a
stream of talents flowing from Frederick Taylor's campaigns
for scientific m anagem ent" (Barber 1985, 13). The latter
Division, as Hunt observed in his 1924 volume S cie n tific

Management Since Taylor, was organised as a national agency
"through which the elim ination of w asteful types and
varieties of products, processes and methods can be brought
about as a result of voluntary agreement by groups of
producers, distributors and users" (Hunt 1924, xiii). The
consequent savings of this latter division alone were
estimated to be $600 million per annum which, as Barber
(1985, 13) has noted, was no trivial sum in an economy in
which value added by the manufacturing sector was $18
billion.
In the midst of the deep economic slump of 1920-1922
H oover also had H unt organise the first nation al
unem ploym ent conference ever convened by a federal
governm ent departm ent— the President's Conference on
Unem ploym ent. The latter act led to the creation of a
permanent comm ittee which under the guidance of Hunt
published or actively collaborated with the Am erican
Engineering Council in the preparation of a number of major
studies directly related to the stabilisation of the business cycle
through the first half of the 1920s. These reports included,
Business Cycles and Unemployment (1922-1923), Coal Storage
(1923-1924) and S easonal Operation in the C on stru ction
Industries (1923-1924).
The stabilisation reports advocated a number of devices for
reducing both the volatility of the business cycle and
unem ployment. These included the use of public works
spending as a countercyclical device and the establishment of
public employment exchanges. However, what distinguishes
the reports was the degree of emphasis placed on the extent to
which improving the management of individual enterprises
could enhance stabilisation. This perspective reflected the
focus of those scientific managers concerned with the issue of
unemployment in the early 1920s. Their perspective was well

captured in the following statement by Morris Cooke in a
paper on unem ploym ent and underem ploym ent he
published in the BTS in 1921. "The maximum relief from the
evils attendant upon unem ploym ent w ill com e about
through a localization of the problem within the individual
manufacturing plants" (Cooke, 1921, 163). The Taylorists did
not believe the scientific manager, operating solely within the
enterprise, could solve the unemployment problem per se. As
Person observed, in an address to the American Association of
Public Employment Officers in 1920, the scientific manager's
focus was the "immediate operating policies and methods" of
the enterprise. Much of the root cause of unemployment, on
the other hand, was centred at that level of business activity
that was speculative and\or was concerned with the "farreaching, governing activities" of enterprises. Even so, Person
insisted, scientific management could contribute greatly to the
minimisation of the unemployment problem by enhancing
the operating methods of the firm.
Most enterprises operate under competitive conditions in markets
in which the demand fluctuates. Business has not learned how to
free itself from those alternating conditions known as buyers' and
sellers' markets; not have many enterprises learned how to free
themselves from the seasonal demands which characterise the
disposition of their output. Under such circumstances the taking
on of workers in one year and the discharge of workers in another
year, or the taking on of workers in one season and their
discharge in another, is to some degree inevitable; and only the
most scientific of managements is able to reduce these variations
in employment to a minimum. The competitive enterprise which
succeeds in reducing these variations to a minimum is the
enterprise which works out a balanced production of the various
products according to seasonal demand; which establishes a

schedule which coordinates the financing, producing and selling
of these products; which has such organization and methods of
planning and operating control in its several departments as to
maintain the schedule of coordinated financing, production and
selling; which as a result of exhaustive investigation and
analysis has such command of the elements entering into its
operations as to make possible the coordinations, schedules and
controls I am enumerating .... In the degree to which an enterprise
has such management may it hope to achieve continuity of
employment. That kind of management is scientific management
(Person 1921,51).
In 1922 the scientific managers' perspective regarding the
contribution of the firm to market stabilisation was further
clarified in the BTS by H. Feldman, research secretary for the
E co n o m ic A d v iso ry C om m ittee of the P resid en t's
Unemployment Conference. In an aptly titled paper, 'The
New Emphasis in the Problem of Reducing Unemployment',
Feldman lauded William Beveridge and Sidney and Beatrice
Webb for highlighting the fact that unemployment "is not
due to overpopulation, immigration, changes in the gold
supply and other disturbing factors, but to cyclical fluctuation,
seasonal irregularity and other m aladjustm ents of the
industrial system" (Feldman 1922, 177). While applauding his
British counterparts Feldman observed that he believed the
contribution of these individuals was flawed by a failure to
appreciate the part that can be played by the individual firm.
[A]n important cause of unemployment might be in the slipshod,
careless and planless management prevalent in various firms ....
that some employers, at least, could cut down the irregularity of
their businesses by improvements in the technique of business
administration (Feldman 1922, 176).

Noting that firms whose heads were members of the Taylor
Society had been particularly prominent in the development
of enterprise stabilisation he reported that the President's
Committee on Unemployment was seeking to encourage
American industry as a whole to adopt similar strategies. Like
Person he acknowledged that enterprise stabilisation alone
would not solve the unem ployment problem but also
insisted:
When efficient management has done all that should be
expected of it, the disease of unemployment will be so moderated
that a complete cure through the aid of the other and less
important remedies discussed should not be difficult (Feldman
1922,182; see also Feiss 1921).

THE 'SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION'
The Taylorists' emphasis on microeconomic reform in the
first half of the 1920s was reflected in the BTS. Through this
period the articles published that were directly relevant to the
problem of stabilisation tended to emphasise the individual
firm. However, one key aspect of economic stabilisation the
contributors to the journal did believe needed to be handled at
a macro level was the management of the nation's money
supply. In 1921 Irving Fisher presented a paper to the Taylor
Society in which he argued that the stabilisation of the
economy and the full development of efficient production
were simply not possible without a stable currency. Fisher was
a pioneer in the development of index numbers which were
capable of showing the average change in prices over time. He
had a deep respect for Frederick Taylor and believed that his
own character, ideals and methods of work were identical
with those of Taylor (Fisher 1956, 215). The development of

effective means of measuring price changes, Fisher also
believed, had provided the basic instruments required for the
"scientific management of the money supply". Fisher's paper,
'H ow an U nstabilized Dollar Interferes with Efficient
M anagem ent', argued that falling prices tend to have a
dampening effect on the economy. He also observed that if
prices changed it often took consumers and investors an
extended period before they adjusted their spending patterns
accordingly. The deleterious effect this rigidity had on
economic behaviour, he observed, could be overcome with
the use of index numbers. Using these numbers the Federal
Reserve Bank could manipulate the money supply in a
manner which would adjust the amount of money in the
economy in accordance with changes in prices and so stabilise
the purchasing power of the dollar. Only if the currency was
stabilised, Fisher insisted, would it be possible to contain the
volatility of the business cycle.
Fisher's claim that the Federal Reserve should manage the
money supply so as to ensure price and hence market
stabilisation was welcomed by the Taylor Society. Likewise,
the Society gave the approval of publication to a paper
presented at its next meeting by Carl Snyder of the Federal
Reserve. Snyder's paper, 'Barometers of Production', argued
that m arket sta b ilisa tio n required that the Fed eral
Government not only develop a stabilised system of currency
but that it also stabilise credit and establish a means for
providing accurate and detailed data that would enable
business to understand what was happening within the
economy (Snyder 1921,186-187).
While the Taylorists in the early 1920s approved of Fisher's
ideas, even at this stage some individuals saw the dire
possibilities inherent in his analysis. The first indication of
this concern in the BTS was a paper by Person titled 'Shaping

Your Management To Meet Changing Industrial Conditions'.
Person, whom it should be noted had a PhD in economics,
presented his paper to the Society in November 1922. This was
a time when the economy of the USA was emerging from the
post-w ar depression and entering the period of rapid
industrial growth that was to characterise most of the rest of
the decade. In his article, Person warned that there was a new
predicament looming for American industry. This problem
centred on the relationship between prices, demand and the
productive capacity of industry.
During the past decade, as a result of the study of earlier cyclic
movements, we have learned that certain economic phenomena,
such as the quantity of money and credit, have a definite
relation to industrial activity. The store of money and credit
influences prices and the price movement influences industrial
activity. We should recall that the long period of accelerating
industrial activity culminating in the frenzy of 1920-21 was
coincident with a long upward swing in prices; that in general
industrial activity increases in intensity with an upward price
movement, is stagnant when there is a downward price
movement, and is hesitant and uncertain in the early years of a
new stable price level. Of course, the ideal condition is a fairly
stable general price level, but when a condition of stable price
level suddenly confronts an industrial generation which has
become accustomed to a consistent upward price movement over a
long period, the new condition of stability, because different from
the accustomed, is upsetting to the individual, either as
demander or producer, and it takes a considerable period,
measured not in months but in years, for him to learn just what he
can safely do both in purchasing and in producing (Person 1922,
212).

Why the effect of price changes so concerned Person was

because the Harvard Committee on Economic Research had
recently forecast that over the next decade prices were likely to
remain at a new high level. He doubted the validity of this
assessment because he felt the Harvard Committee had "failed
to take into consideration the capacity of A m erican
managerial genius to vastly increase, when put to it under
intensely competitive conditions, the quantity of goods for
exchange which may be produced from a given combination
of plant, equipment, materials and labor" (Person 1922, 213).
However, even if the Committee's forecast was correct it
suggested that for some time into the future both producers
and consumers were likely to be unsure of the new relation
between their incomes and the cost of living. The conclusion
he urged the members of the Taylor Society to draw from
these observations was that for the next decade consumers'
demand was likely to remain hesitant and uncertain. Given
the nation's newly developed capacity to produce, a capacity
which Person correctly predicted was likely to be enhanced
through the 1920s, this would mean demand was likely to be
out of proportion to the supply of goods. Having made these
observations Person advised his listen ers that these
developm ents confronted American management with a
fundamental problem.
The essential practical elements of the problem .... may be
summed up as follows: On the side of supply there is a
tremendous production capacity involving heavy investments of
capital in more or less specialized equipment, to preserve the
value of which will require a continuation of the lines of activity
for which it was designed. On the other side of demand there is a
conservative and hesitant market—in fact a buyers' market—
which will continue for a considerable period (Person 1922, 214).
Person insisted that he was confident that American

management could resolve the demand problem. However,
to achieve this objective it was imperative that the managers
of enterprises give much greater attention to the social
sciences in order that they might better com prehend the
nature of an economy characterised by a buyers market. They
needed also to accord much greater attention to the problems
associated with marketing. It was no longer adequate to
concentrate merely on developing the scientific management
of production. In an econom ic environm ent in w hich
demand could not be assumed to be readily forthcoming it
was imperative that an equal degree of attention be applied to
the management of markets.
Person's concern with the issue of demand management
was reflected in the BTS. Through the middle years of the
decade numerous papers appeared in the journal advising
managers on how they could improve their marketing and
coordinate sales and production. There was also a laudation of
the productive benefits of high wages and an increase in the
number of articles on the positive role that trade unions could
play in ensuring workers received a share of the rewards of
enhanced production com m ensurate w ith th eir input.
P erson's suggestion that the scie n tific m an agem ent
movement needed to pay much greater attention to the study
of how markets functioned was also reflected with the journal
publishing an increasing number of articles w ritten by
economists on the relationship between output and demand.
The initial BTS contribution from the economists in reply
to the concerns raised by Person came from Irving Fisher who
in 1924 leapt to the defence of Say's law. Fisher insisted there
was no real problem as far as demand was concerned for the
market would ensure that as output increased so did real
wages.

Even if it were possible for employers at first to "hog" all the
savings accruing from scientific management and refuse to give
any bonus to labor, in the end the advantages would percolate
through-out society just as today we all get the advantage of the
telephone despite the enormous returns to the few original
investors. In the end labor gains the most from so-called "labor
saving devices." Increased production means simply increased
income to society, and the wage earner as a class usually profits
most in the end. Scientific management by which the bricklayer
doubles or quadruples the number of bricks laid, reduces the rent
of brick houses. Scientific management which makes more shoes
and clothes decreases the real cost of shoes and clothes to all.
Real wages consist of shoes and clothes and shelter and food and
the other things which labor consumes. Any device which
facilitates their production tends to increase real wages (Fisher
1924, 241).
Fisher concluded his contribution by advising employers
and employees to focus ever more closely on increasing
output and leave the issue of distribution to the market. His
faith in market forces, however, does not appear to have
satisfied the apprehension of all those who were concerned
with the relationship between output, consumption and
econom ic stabilisation. In December 1925 Paul Douglas
presented a paper at the American Economic Association
Conference titled 'The Movement of Real Wages and its
Economic Significance'. In this paper Douglas traced the
change in wages that had occurred in the United States
through the period 1895 -1924. He reported that in 1924 wageeam ers in manufacturing and transportation could purchase
27 per cent more goods and services than in 1890 with
virtually all of this improvement having occurred since 1914.
He acknowledged that worker productivity through the post1914 period of accelerated productivity growth had increased

at a faster rate than the real increase in wages. However, he
suggested that most of the discrepancy could be explained by
the significant increase that had occurred in the proportion of
the workforce employed as salaried staff (Douglas 1925).
Douglas's conclusion that employees were in fact receiving
an almost proportional share of the rewards of the increasing
productivity of American industry was accepted by the
discussants at the economists' conference. This included
George Soule, an individual who subsequently became a
com m itted participant in the scien tific m anagem ent
movement and a critic of those who had failed to give
sufficient consideration to the problem of effective demand.
H ow ever, more interesting for our purposes was the
contribution of the industrialist Magnus W. Alexander. The
latter observed that he was not an economist but an engineer
who was interested in the extent to which economic theory
could reveal facts and furnish guiding principles to practising
industrial managers. Reflecting the Taylorist's concern with
the issue of distribution he observed that what managers
especially needed from the economists was a formula that
would provide a basis for equitably dividing the wealth
produced by industry's utilisation of scientific management
amongst society's many competing interests. He was insistent
that this formula must be both capable of dealing with
dynamic situations and of being adapted to the specifics of
differing industries and enterprises. This was because:
Efficiency, first of all, is a problem of individuals and cases, in
relation to particular processes or separate productive
organizations. Scientific management, which is the fundamental
basis of efficiency, is concerned only with the organization of
men, materials, and machines, for the most effective manufacture
of particular products in particular plants under particular

conditions. Therefore, organizations and formulas embracing
diverse groups, different establishments, diverse processes,
however pertinent they may be to other purposes, are necessarily
irrelevant or extraneous to the requirements of scientific
management (Alexander 1926,67).
Alexander was not alone at the 1925 conference in
observing that industry was in dire need of an effective
th eo retical instrum ent for allocatin g the "fru its of
production". This claim was also voiced by John Frey of the
American Federation of Labor. At a round table session on,
T h e Consuming Power of Labor and Business Fluctuations'
Frey disputed the claim that workers were being paid a wage
com m ensurate with their increasing productivity. W hile
lauding the contribution of the engineers to the management
of resources he noted that "perfect m anagem ent" of an
enterprise was of little value if the firm was sim ply not
operating. He therefore urged the economists to find some
means to enhance the purchasing power of the worker.
Where Person, with whom the AFL was by this time closely
collaborating, had accepted that American managers would
find a way to deal with the demand problem, Frey was much
more alarmist.
The greatest problem facing modern industry is the fact that it
has failed to establish a market which could purchase its
products. Unless wages increase in proportion to the increasing
power of industry to produce, depressions in business must become
increasingly frequent and severe. Cycles of business will
undoubtedly continue, but the extent and duration of depressions
will be influenced very largely by the purchasing power of wages
which are being paid (Frey 1926, 83).
Alexander and Frey's request for a formula for equitably

dividing the rewards of increased productivity produced fruit
in the form of the Cobb-Douglas function. Cobb and Douglas
presented the results of their collaboration at the 1927
conference of the American Economics Association in a
session titled 'Economic and Social Aspects of Increased
Productive Efficiency'. As a consequence of a request from the
Economics Association, W oodlief Thomas of the Federal
Reserve Board also presented a paper at this session. The
latter's paper, 'The Economic Significance of the Increased
Efficiency of American Industry', observed that in the sixteen
years 1899 to 1914 productivity growth in manufacturing had
expanded by less than 0.5 per cent. In the eight years 1919 to
1926 conversely output per worker increased by almost 40%.
Nor was this expansion confined to m anufacturing for
comparable rates of growth were experienced in mining,
transportation and agriculture (Thomas 1928; Durand 1930).
A rate of productivity growth of this magnitude, Douglas
(1927, 20) noted elsewhere, was "probably unparalleled in the
history of the world". This perspective was endorsed by Ewan
Clague who in a series of articles in the M onthly L abor
R eview reported on the extent of the transformation within
US industry. Clauge (1926,1) argued that the United States was
experiencing what was "perhaps the most remarkable advance
in productive efficiency in the history of the m odern
industrial system " and that the nature and extent of this
advance was such that it had to be considered nothing less
than a "second industrial revolution". What had caused this
phenomena, Clauge advised, was difficult to specify. He
identified what he thought were the m ore significant
influences amongst which he included the rationalising
activities of the scientific management movement. However,
he failed to accord any weighting to these influences and
hence his contribution was more a sketch than an exercise in

explanatory analysis.
Others proved less reluctant when asked to explain the
extremely high rates of productivity growth that characterised
American industry in the 1920s. Through the rest of the
decade foreign observers flocked to the United State seeking to
find the secret of America's enhanced ability to produce. The
opinions of these individuals was summarised by Edwin Gay
in the 1929 volume Recent Economic Changes. This book was
the product of a study commissioned by Hoover which sought
to specify the character and source of the post-war productivity
eruption. In his summation Gay noted that while foreign
observers emphasised the importance of America's natural
resources, labour saving machinery and vast market when
explaining US prosperity, they invariably concluded that an
important factor inducing the post-war acceleration in the rate
of grow th was the widespread adoption of scientific
management practices. Indeed, many concluded that this was
the key explanatory factor.
The problem of correlating abundant resources, expensive labor,
and unsurpassed machine equipment, to serve the greatest of
markets, has put a high premium on management and organizing
capacity. Scientific management in industry and commerce,
apparently the resultant of emerging pressures, is thought by
many of the foreigners writing on recent economic changes in the
United States to be the chief contribution which this country is
making to economic welfare and to be the key to its success (Gay
1929, 5).
Hunt (1929, 35-39) reported in the BTS that the American
contributors to Recent Economic Changes generally endorsed
the perspective of these foreign observers. It was accepted that
the application of scientific management practices into ever
new areas of the economy had given a tremendous boost to

the pre-existing forces inducing productivity growth within
the economy. Hunt advised that W esley M itchell had
captured accurately the conclusions of the contributors in a
"single striking sentence" when the latter observed: "Since
1921, Americans have applied intelligence to the day's work
more effectively than ever before". W hile a little more
verbose, the spirit and essence of the report was possibly best
captured by Stanley H. Jevons in The Econom ic Jou rn al in
1931. Appreciating the implications of what was happening in
America Jevons observed:
The Advanced industrial countries of the world are now in the
first stage of a sweeping change of the methods and organisation
of all their secondary industries, and .... this new movement is
likely to be comparable in its industrial, commercial and social
effects with that series of changes which commenced in the
latter half of the eighteenth century and is commonly called the
Industrial Revolution. The changes are coming about as the result
not merely of the application of scientific knowledge to industry,
which was, in fact, the last phase of the first industrial
revolution, but of the use of the inductive method in the study of
an industry, and individual concerns composing it, with a view of
gaining facts and generalisations which may serve sooner or later
as the basis of the replanning of the productive process and
plant. The essence of the new industrial revolution is the search
for exact knowledge, and the planning of processes: from the
minutiae of manual operations (based on motion study) to the
lay-out of the machinery of a gigantic plant—even of a whole
industry throughout the country (Jevons 1931,1).
Jevons accepted that the 'second industrial revolution' had
been a long time in coming and that the American scientific
managers were not the only contributors to its developm ent.
However, he made it clear that he also accepted that the "date

1911, when Taylor published his famous P rinciples o f
Scientific M anagement, inaugurates a definite acceleration of
the second industrial revolution" (Jevons 1931: 2).
The members of the Taylor Society were themselves more
circu m sp ect in u tilisin g the term 'Second Industrial
Revolution' but accepted that the significance of what was
occurring in the United States justified its use. Shortly after
the publication of R ecent Econom ic Changes and at the
instigation of Edward Filene of the Taylor Society, the
American Academy of Political and Social Science held a
conference under the rubric of 'The Second Industrial
Revolution and its Significance'. The subsequent volume of
the Academy's A n n als was edited by Percy S. Brown, a past
president of the Taylor Society. In his opening address Henry
Dennison (1930, 1-2) observed that he had sympathy with the
"more careful social scientists" who were troubled by the term
'Second Industrial Revolution' but justified its utilisation as
accurately capturing the speed of the recent economic changes
that had occurred within the United States. He also justified
the utilisation of the term on the pragmatic grounds that it
was critical that analysts appreciate the urgency of the need to
give consideration to the probable consequences of the
transformation that was occurring.
The concern Dennison clearly felt was also expressed by
H.S. Person. In his paper to the conference Person attempted
to highlight the fact that the Committee on Recent Economic
Changes had concluded that the outstanding problem of the
day confronting industry was the need to find some means for
attaining economic balance. Noting that both classical and
Marxist economics assumed demand always pressed upon
supply he insisted that what was happening in America had
negated this assumption.

Within two decades .... the very productivity of scientific
management and of mechanization has transformed the
assumption in economic conduct to that of a surplus economy.
While it may be that this concept of a surplus economy cannot be
permanent, it is now, and apparently for a long time will be, the
dominant influence in our economic conduct (Person 1930,91).
It was therefore critical that appropriate demand-centred
policies be developed that could deal with this new situation.
What America required urgently, Person and Dennison had
come to believe, were new techniques for managing the
economy at the macro level. Further, they believed that it was
necessary to accept that in some instances these techniques
would have to involve "direct and indirect social control of
the individual enterpriser through measures analogous to
traffic lights" (Person 1930, 90). In short, they believed the
problems generated by the emergence of a surplus society
simply could not be left to resolve themselves and moreover
their resolution could not be left in hands of an unregulated
market.
[W]e must manage ourselves if we are to gain on the past. No
laissez faire, no unchanneled and unimpeded course of nature, no
invisible hand will do it for us. Unless there is growing social
control to meet the unquestioned growing social complexity, most
of us must believe, I think, that we can expect no happier fate for
mankind; and many of us would risk the prediction of
retrogression to ultimate catastrophe (Dennison 1930,1-2).

DEMAND MANAGEMENT AND DEPRESSION
The perspective advanced by Dennison and Person in 1930
was far and away from the enterprise centred focus they had

advocated in the early years of the 1920s. An understanding of
how this transform ation came about can be attained by
examining the debates that occurred within the Taylor Society
in the later years of the decade. Perusing the BTS it is clear that
from late 1927 at least some of the leaders of scientific
management movement were becoming concerned that their
stabilisation policies were not having the degree of success
that had been envisaged. In December 1927 the industrialist
Wilfred Lewis delivered a paper to the Taylor Society in
w hich he lauded the achievem ents of the scien tific
m anagem ent m ovem ent. Lewis claim ed the four key
objectives of the movement had become the reduction of
costs, the raising of wages, the encouragement of collaboration
between employers and employees and the full employment
of w orkers and machinery. The extent to which these
objectives were being attained, he concluded, enabled the
people of "America to look forward hopefully to the future"
(Lewis 1927, 557).
The response to Lew is' paper indicated that not all
members of the Taylor Society shared his optimism. While he
was praised by some commentators, his suggestion that there
was wide acceptance amongst employers of the positive value
of high wages was challenged. It was also observed that his
belief the good times were "practically certain to continue .... is
an assumption which may well be questioned" (Muste 1928,
47). The concern within the Society was also manifested at the
December 1927 convention by the presentation of two papers
dealing with m acroeconom ic demand management and
wages respectively. Person's decision to accept these latter
papers for presentation and subsequent publication was a
consequence of his concern at the fact that unemployment
had risen sharply in mid 1927 and his belief that the enterprise
focused strategy for attaining stabilisation had not realised its

desired goals. He noted in an editorial in the BTS that the
enterprise focus had not even been able to achieve a situation
where it was possible to be certain as to what was likely to
confront the firm in the near future. This failure he suggested,
raised the "large question" of whether the focus of the
scientific manager had to be expanded beyond the level of the
enterprise.
Can the planning which has proved to be effective in co
ordinating the departments of the individual enterprise be
established on a plane on which enterprises are but departments
of one integral social enterprise? Is it possible to formulate a
social budget through which government operations are so
administered as to effect regulation of the total of individual
enterprises (Person 1928,1)?
The Taylorists' concern with this much wider notion of
management was also a m anifestation of their grow ing
interest in the European rationalisation movement (Person
1927, 391-393). Of this latter movement Person observed
subsequently that while the rationalisers had focused initially
on the macro economy they had come to embrace issues that
had traditionally concerned the scientific m anagem ent
movement. At the same time the scientific managers had
been concomitantly expanding their notions of what were the
limits of scientific management.
Starting from opposite poles scientific management and
rationalization are apparently moving each toward the other.
With a background of experience with state socialism, the latter
thought first in terms of socially controlled reorganization of all
industry and then of scientific management of the particular
situation. Scientific management, on the other hand, with its
background of extreme individualism, started with the problem

of the individual plant, then proceeded to application of its
principles and technique to the management of groups of plants
under one ownership. Socially it has developed the concept of
voluntary trade standardization. Ultimately, although
probably still with individualistic bias, it may in America come
to be applied to the organization and control of entire industries
and all industry (Person 1929, 15-16).
The paper on demand management presented at the
December 1927 convention was by H.B. Brougham of the
Poliak foundation for Economic Research. Brougham's paper,
'Must Prosperity Be Planned?', examined the question of
whether effective demand could be adapted, controlled and
graduated in line with the increased capacity of industry. He
began by criticising Hoover's waste study observing that the
latter had advised that the stabilisation of production required
that productive capacity be based upon the careful study of
existing demand. This advice, he asserted, was the perspective
of the individual who sought merely to plan for the
enterprise. One who wished to plan for the nation,
conversely, must adopt a very different approach seeking not
to stabilise production but to constantly expand output and to
facilitate this process by ensuring that there was adequate
purchasing power in the market. In short: "Normal demand
should be based on a careful study of productive capacity, and
should be steadily increased as capacity to produce increases"
(Brougham 1928, 2).
Brougham observed that if the general purchasing power
of consumers could not be increased in line with the increased
productive capacity of the nation it would be impossible to
avoid periodic economic recessions. Drawing upon Douglas's
paper on the movement of real wages he asserted that the fact
that the incomes of workers had increased dramatically since
1921 was a critical factor contributing to the economic

prosperity the nation was experiencing. He observed,
however, the number of wage earners enjoying this new
found prosperity was a matter of concern. The Census of
Manufactures had shown that between 1919 and 1925, a period
during which the population had grown by 12 per cent, the
number of wage earners in manufacturing had decreased by
seven per cent. Brougham refused to embrace Douglas' easy
dismissal of the declining number of wage workers and urged
the members of the Taylor Society to give consideration to the
effect of this phenomena on effective demand. He conceded
that thus far there had not occurred a crisis of overproduction
but suggested that this was primarily because of the vast
increase in bank credit created by the "easy money" policies
that had been followed by the Federal Reserve Board since
1922. Aware that it was not possible for the banks to
continuously expand credit Brougham suggested the answer
lay in the creation, at a federal level, of a department of
management engineering whose purpose would be to manage
the economy. It would do so by expanding investments in
"non-productive assets" such as public buildings and parks
when there was excessive capacity within industry and would
pay for this investment by increasing taxes at those times
when there was excessive demand.
The second paper at the December 1927 convention
expressing concern with developments in the economy was
presented by the industrialist Henry Williams. The key point
made by Williams was that while managers tended to support
the notion that the payment of high wages was to be
applauded, with few exceptions they remained as obdurate as
ever in their opposition to high wages within their own
enterprises. He called therefore for the Taylor Society to give
serious consideration to how the conflict betw een the
immediate interests of managers and the interests of industry

and indeed society as a whole might be overcome.
In the discussion that followed the presentation of the
papers by Brougham and Williams there were differences as
regards the best means of dealing with the demand problem
with some unconvinced there was any serious need for
concern. M oreover, am ongst those who were clearly
perturbed there were differences as to the respective role that
should be accorded the individual firm and the state. Indeed,
there was even disagreement amongst those who accepted the
need for the macroeconomic planning of demand. Thus
Rexford Tugwell (1928, 19) criticised the notion that the
planning of demand could be undertaken effectively within a
capitalist economy observing that planning "in a larger sense,
is, in a free system of enterprise, very nearly an anomaly."
These differences continued to be reflected in the BTS in
the period through to the end of 1929 with the perspective of
the optimists tending to predominate. Indeed, even after the
"unpleasantness associated with the quotation factory at the
com er of Broad and Wall Streets", as the statistician R.W.
Burgess described the stock market crash, many Society
members appear to have remained optimistic as regards the
future. Asked to analyse the results of H oover's R ecen t
E con om ic C hanges study Burgess concluded that the
"economic forces at work in the United States are in the main
well balanced resulting in a very satisfactory background for
vigorous enterprise" (Burgess 1929, 239).
The divergent response to his paper, however, made clear
the growing divisions within the Society. George Soule was
especially critical of the emphasis Burgess placed on the
voluntary involvement of employers in the implementation
of stabilisation strategies. He also criticised the fact that
H oover's report had suggested employers were widely
embracing the wisdom of the economy of high wages. Soule

observed that the available data showed this simply not the
case and insisted that there was a growing disparity between
the nation's capacity to produce and its ability to consume
brought on by the fact that productivity growth was
outstripping the growth of wages. Whereas in 1925 he had
accepted Douglas's claim that workers' incomes were keeping
up with productivity growth he now observed that "the
increase in wage earnings has nowhere paralleled the increase
in the productivity of industry" (Soule 1929, 250). The
voluntary approach to demand management was a failure, he
concluded, and it was imperative that some alternative way be
found to ensure the real income of workers was increased in
line with industry's increasing productivity.
We cannot keep up production unless consumption is adequately
increased to absorb that production, and consumption cannot be
increased unless the wage earners, who form such a large part of
the public, have increased purchasing power .... But the increase
in wage earnings has nowhere paralleled the increase in the
productivity of industry (Soule 1929, 249-250).
Soule in turn was criticised for his contribution by those
m onetarists at the convention who were associated with
Irving Fisher. The latter were particularly incensed at his
suggestion that the trade unions and the anti-trust laws
should be strengthened in order to ensure the rewards of the
enhanced productivity growth were not hoarded by a sm all
minority of the population (Meeker 1929, 251) His concern,
however, appears to have been shared by others as is indicated
by the fact that the Program Committee of the Taylor Society
had invited Wesley C. Mitchell, the Director of the National
Bureau of Economic Research, to present a paper to the
D ecem ber 1929 convention on the issu e o f market
stabilisation. More specifically, M itchell was asked by the

Society to answer the question "Are there practicable steps
toward an industrial equilibrium?" In his reply M itchell
noted that the Committee which had sponsored R ecen t
Economic Changes was convinced the prosperity of American
industry could be sustained only if a balance between the
economic forces within the economy was maintained. The
Committee was also convinced that this would occur only if it
was possible to "develop a technique of balance" (Mitchell
1930, 4). Mitchell noted economic theory generally accepted
that capitalist economies tend to gravitate in the direction of
equilibrium even if they never attain this state. The "theorist"
therefore believed there was no need to develop a new
technique of balance because it already existed as an inherent
part of the market system. However, said theorist also
acknowledged that "real life commercial demand and supply"
were not based on adequate knowledge and that in this area
there was "plenty of room for improvement" (Mitchell 1930,
4). One "su btle problem " that especially needed to be
confronted in this regard was how to dissem inate the
knowledge required to ensure there was adequate demand
within the economy. He noted approvingly that at that very
moment in Washington, Hoover was gathering together the
major economic interests of the nation in order to undertake,
on a national scale, a step of "great technical interest". This
was the President's attempt to induce the major industrialists
to agree to maintain wages and prices in order to avoid the
collapse into depression. Mitchell called upon the managers of
the Taylor Society to not only support this national effort but
to strive to take further steps within industry that would
contribute towards industrial equilibrium.
M itchell's observation that the Taylor Society should
support H o o v er's efforts in W ashington was given
overwhelming endorsement. The Society passed a formal

motion that both supported Hoover and called for an even
greater role for the state in the management of the economy
(Taylor Society 1929, 253). Indeed, the more interventionist
participants at the convention went further than M itchell
probably intended. Stuart Chase (1930, 9), who in 1926 had
published a book The Tragedy of Waste which lauded the
contribution of the scientific management to the heightening
of industrial efficiency, for example, urged Society members
both to study the experiments being conducted by the Soviet
economic planners and to support the establishment of an
"economic general staff" which would advise on economic
policy both at the national and regional level.
The need for a more interventionist and regulatory state
was also argued by Leonard Kuvin of the Index Number
Institute who insisted that the most important element in
what he saw was a looming economic crisis was the "impeded
growth in the standard of living". Strategies to deal with the
"chronic condition" into which the economy was collapsing,
he observed, "must deal effectively with the inability of
consumers to acquire for use the goods which they are so
instrumental in producing" (Kuvin 1930, 13). In support of his
claim that there was a "disharmony between the forces of
production and the forces of consumption", Kuvin provided
data from the Bureau of the Census that revealed the extent to
w hich the productive capacity of US ind u stry was
underutilised. He also provided evidence that wage earners
were receiving a decreasing proportion of the nation's output
and suggested this development was especially worrying
because employers were utilising the funds that should have
been paid to labour to further expand their capacity to
produce.
The consequence of these development was a "vicious
circle of excess capacity and limited dem and" a situation

which, he insisted, had reached a stage where it could not be
penetrated in a simple fashion. He observed that at the
present time two methods were being put into operation
under the leadership of Hoover. One was psychological
involving the inducement of confidence amongst the nation's
industrialists and the other was the reduction in taxes and the
increase in funds for public works. What was really required,
however, was some means of increasing wages and reducing
the prices of commodities and it was America's lack of any
such devise that was the key element inducing the existing
crisis. Consequently, America must develop on a national
scale an effective method of credit regulation and control
which would systematically expand credit to those industries
underequiped and curb temporarily the availability of credit to
those that were overequiped. If this could be achieved, Kuvin
concluded, the "chronic disproportion between productive
and consum ptive capacities" would be overcom e and
America "be one step nearer the practical achievement of a
program of industrial equilibrium" (Kuvin 1930, 15).
Hoover's valiant attempt to halt the oncoming depression
by coordinating the price and wage policies of the major
industrialists and by limited deficit spending has been well
documented by Barber (1985). The President sadly, proved
incapable of breaking with the stabilisation policies he had
helped to develop through the early and middle years of the
1920s even when the growing magnitude of the crisis made
clear the inadequacy of these policies. As a consequence of
Hoover's refusal to embrace a more radical, statist program
the leaders of the Taylor Society turned to the Democratic
Party and to Roosevelt. Indeed, many Taylorists played a
major role in the development and implementation of the
policies associated of the Roosevelt Administration. These
included Justice Louis Brandeis— the individual who coined

the term scientific management; Stuart Chase who did the
same for the New Deal; Rexford Tugwell who became one of
the most influential members of Roosevelt's Brains Trust;
Henry Dennison and Lincoln Filene who largely constituted
the liberal wing of the Administration's Business Advisory
Council and Morris Cooke, a man whom Soule (1967, 128)
reports was the primary architect of the "most successful and
the most celebrated of all the projects undertaken under the
New Deal"—the Tennessee Valley Authority.
In his analysis of Hoover and his policies, Barber cites
Tugwell to the effect that the New Dealers owed much to
H oover especially as regards his enlargem ent of the
knowledge available to those who would seek to extend the
visible hand. He notes that Tugwell readily acknowledged that
the brains trust got much of its material from the Hoover
Committees or from the work done under their auspices.
Barber (1985, 194) concludes his book by quoting Tugwell's
observation that: "The Hundred Days was the breaking of a
dam rather than the conjuring out of nowhere of a river". It is
most appropriate to bring this paper towards a conclusion by
citing Tugwell shortly before the dam burst as to what he
believed had fed this river. In 1932, in an address to the
American Economics Association Tugwell observed:
If we have been watching, describing, analysing industry as we
should, we must have known that the greatest economic event of
the nineteenth century occurred when Frederick W. Taylor first
held a stop watch on the movements of a group of shovelers in
the plant of the Midvale Steel Company .... The forces which
were to make the future went unnoticed. The world is paying now
for this dogmatic dream of the economists .... If we had had eyes
to see the implications of Taylor's work we should have known
that the vast expansion of production which must follow would

clog all the old channels of trade, swamp the mechanisms of an
artificially limited commerce, and end in a period of violent
reconstruction. Some of the sufferings of the present might
possibly have been avoided. We failed to understand because our
eyes were blind to the technology which was revolutionizing the
materials of our science (Tugwell 1932: 87).

CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to add to the literature produced by the
revisionist historians who have challenged the notion that
scientific management was primarily an anti-worker labour
control strategy. By utilising a largely unexplored primary
source, The Bulletin o f the Taylor Society, it has been possible
to sketch the manner by which the stabilisation policies of the
scientific managers matured in the years through to 1930. In
the B T S there is a clear evolutionary expansion in the
thinking of the Taylorists. Beginning by concentrating on the
development of stabilisation practices at the workshop level
they came to focus in time on the whole firm and finally
became convinced that an effective stabilisation program
must embrace all levels of the economic environment.
We believe that by revealing the extent and nature of the
Taylorists' involvement with the issue of market stabilisation
we have been able to uncover another dimension of their
work. We have also furthered explanation of why the labour
movement in the United States came to collaborate with the
scientific management movement in the interwar years. This
is an all but impossible phenomena to explain if one remains
confined within the narrow Braverman/labour-process view
of scien tific m anagem ent. However, it is possible to
understand if a broader evaluation of this m ovem ent is
accepted. With this broader perspective it is not difficult to

perceive how it could be that while organised labour might
remain suspicious and even hostile towards some of the
practices of the Taylorists they would be attracted to analysts
who sought to develop programs that provided workers not
only with higher wages and reduced working hours but also
with greater job security.
In her 1989 reevaluation of the work of the scientific
managers in the area of public adm inistration, Schachter
urged the need for analysts who seek to understand the
scientific management movement to cease relying solely on
text books and secondary literature. Sadly, this is advice which
analysts in the areas of industrial relations and labour history
appear extremely reluctant to heed. In the literature which
seeks to appraise the nature of the movement it is common to
come across articles, books and even Ph.D.s in which authors
fail to cite the movement's main journal and base their
explanations of the nature of scientific m anagem ent on
secondary literature with perhaps a partial reading of Taylor
thrown in for good measure. The ignoring of such primary
data as the Taylor Society's journal, we suggest, is not only
poor scholarship it is also unjust. The scientific managers
deserve better treatment.
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